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The discussion is, perhaps, not as comprehensive as it could have been (compare, for example,
the more detailed consideration given to similar issues in Stuart Green’s Lying, Cheating and
Stealing (2006)). It might also have benefitted from mentioning the work of Antony Duff and
others who have argued that a focus on harm is misplaced and it is the notion of a public wrong
that ought to inform decisions about criminalisation (see e.g. Duff’s Answering for Crime:
Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (2007)). That said, the aim of the book was not
to provide a comprehensive account of the criminalisation debate and it should not therefore
be judged on this basis.
Chapter six contains a more extensive criticism of the way in which breach of the peace has
been defined and interpreted by the courts. Ferguson notes that even since the arrival of the
new statutory offences discussed in chapter four, some conduct that would more appropriately
fall within their auspices is still being prosecuted as breach of the peace, something she rightly
criticises on the basis that it sits uncomfortably with the principle of fair labelling (116). The
chapter also discusses a number of other problematic issues, most notably the requirement
within the definition of breach of the peace for a “public element” to the conduct (Harris v
HM Advocate 2010 JC 245). This has led to a series of confusing and contradictory cases, to the
extent that it is almost impossible to predict whether conduct will fall within the ambit of the
offence or not (see the excellent discussion at 110-115). Ferguson makes the telling observation
that if the Lord Advocate gives evidence to the Justice Committee that is not consistent with
charging practice in reported cases (113), then something is clearly amiss.
On this and other issues, the critique contained in the book is a pertinent one. Ferguson’s
suggested way forward is a narrower statutory definition of breach of the peace along the lines
of that contained in the Draft Criminal Code for Scotland (of which she was a co-author),
accompanied by the use of existing statutory alternatives for conduct that does not fit within
this re-definition. This seems eminently sensible and the book sets out a convincing case for
proceeding along these lines. All in all, this is an impressively thorough account of the case law
and practice and a persuasive argument for law reform. The insights contained are enhanced by
the author’s prior experience as a procurator fiscal. This experience shines through in a text that
has both practical and scholarly merit. As such, the book will be of great interest to academics,
students and legal practitioners.
Fiona Leverick
University of Glasgow
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Arlie Loughnan, MANIFEST MADNESS: MENTAL INCAPACITY IN THE
CRIMINAL LAW
Oxford: Oxford University Press (www.oup.com), 2012. xxii + 212 pp. ISBN 9780199698592.
£65.
In this monograph Arlie Loughnan offers a fresh understanding of the way that mental
incapacity doctrines operate in the criminal law. She also advances an original account of
the theoretical underpinnings of these doctrines based on their shared characteristics and the
way they interact with one another. Although the book focuses on the law of England and
Wales, the interdisciplinary nature of Loughnan’s research (which draws on law, psychology
and philosophy) and her holistic approach to the subject ensure that her insights hold broad
significance.
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In the first part of the book Loughnan presents the case for rethinking mental incapacity
doctrines. In doing so, she cites the commonly-held perception that this area of the law is
a “rag-bag” (4) set of complex legal constructs that are characterised by unusual rules of
evidence and conflict between medical and legal sources of knowledge. In contrast (though
not in contradiction) to this account, Loughnan advances an alternative reconstruction of the
mental incapacity terrain, which transcends its traditional boundaries. By focusing her attention
beyond mental incapacity defences and including doctrines such as automatism and infancy,
which are not routinely included in discussions of mental incapacity, Loughnan aims to expose
the unappreciated commonalities that link the disparate legal doctrines and to uncover the
deep structure of this area of the law.
This task is arguably the most innovative undertaking of the book and, consequently, it is also
the most stimulating and potentially contestable. Loughnan’s initial reasons for re-drawing the
boundaries of the mental incapacity terrain are robust and convincing, for doing so allows her
to sidestep the “deceptively sharp contrast” between “defences” and “denials of responsibility”
(19). Furthermore, adopting a broad perspective allows Loughnan to develop some new and
engaging arguments about the function and form of mental incapacity doctrines. These include
the claims that mental incapacity doctrines play both inculpatory and exculpatory roles within
the criminal law and that, through the operation of these doctrines, the individuals who rely
upon them are constructed as “abnormal”.
In addition, Loughnan contends that all of the mental incapacity doctrines she examines
share certain features, which justify their inclusion in the paradigm she develops in chapter
three: manifest madness. Based on George Fletcher’s pattern of manifest criminality, manifest
madness comprises an ontological and an epistemological facet. The ontological facet relates
to the way that madness is treated, in Loughnan’s view, as dispositional – in the sense that
it persists over time. The epistemological facet relates to the way that madness is able, in
Loughnan’s view, to be “read off” (49) the defendant’s conduct.
Whether one accepts these arguments depends to some extent on one’s view of the
remaining two parts of the book. This is because Loughnan’s more general, theoretical
claims are founded on the socio-historical analysis of individual mental incapacity doctrines
she conducts in chapters four to nine. In this regard, the book would have benefitted
from slightly more integration, so that the themes of the first three chapters could have
more explicitly permeated the other, more doctrinal chapters. That said, there are two clear
trends that unify Loughnan’s discussion of each mental incapacity doctrine: the increasing
formalisation of the law and the increasing relevance of expert knowledge. The law’s increasing
formalisation constitutes the move away from informal, morally-evaluative legal practices
towards the more technical and morally-neutral practices that typify our contemporary legal
ideals. This process is in turn linked to the growth of expert knowledge, for the process of
formalisation both required and encouraged the use of expert evidence and opinion. Although
Loughnan tracks both of these trajectories in her discussion of the law’s development, she
does not relay a simplistic narrative of change. Instead, she provides a refreshingly frank
account in which the law’s evolution is characterised as much by continuity as it is by
change.
Each of the doctrine-specific chapters demonstrates Loughnan’s detailed and nuanced
grasp of the legal rules, practices and procedures and each amounts to a valuable piece
of freestanding scholarship that will be of interest to scholars and law reformers alike.
Furthermore, on several occasions Loughnan expresses her own interpretation of the particular
doctrine(s) under consideration, such as in her decision to consider infancy and unfitness to
plead in conjunction (chapter four). These are to be welcomed as they elevate the analysis
beyond pure description of the law’s practices and doctrines and demonstrate the originality of
Loughnan’s enterprise.
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One criticism of the book is the absence of a concluding chapter. Including such a chapter
would have provided a valuable opportunity to draw together the complex and sophisticated
arguments put forward in part one of the book, and to re-iterate the points where these
arguments intersect with the doctrinal chapters. Notwithstanding this, Manifest Madness is a
book of great merit. It is a thoroughly researched and engaging piece of work that successfully
marries deep, theoretical and normative issues with detailed consideration of legal doctrine
and procedure, an achievement that few scholars attempt let alone accomplish. Equally
praiseworthy is the socio-historical dimension to Loughnan’s research which, as Loughnan
acknowledges, places her amongst a number of scholars, including Nicola Lacey, Lindsay
Farmer and Alan Norrie, who have given prominence to this type of legal scholarship.
Loughnan is to be congratulated for producing a book that strengthens this exciting field.
Chloë Kennedy
University of Edinburgh
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Geraint Thomas, THOMAS ON POWERS
Oxford: Oxford University Press (www.oup.com), 2nd edn, 2012. cxxvii + 845 pp. ISBN
9780199539697. £235.
Thomas on Powers is a comprehensive study of the rules and principles governing the creation,
exercise, and termination of powers in private law. Fourteen years after the first edition, Powers
remains the only modern monograph dedicated to private law powers in common law. The
current edition is an extensive update and expansion of the previous text. It covers all relevant
judicial and legislative developments in English law, with references to cases in other common
law jurisdictions, including many offshore jurisdictions. For the most part, Thomas maintains
an excellent balance between details relevant to practitioners and underlying themes and
parallels that are of interest for academic researchers. Indeed, in the Preface the author makes
a strong case for the need to narrow the gap between the academic and the practitioner, by
integrating abstract theory and law as practiced in the “real world”.
Three chapters deserve special mention and will be reviewed in more depth. Chapter one
sets the conceptual and terminological framework for the analysis of private law powers. This
chapter is particularly significant for academic scholars, as it goes to the heart of the concept
of power as a fundamental concept of private law. Thomas’ definition of power is limited to
powers over another’s property: power is an authority or mandate conferred on, or reserved
by, a person to deal with, as well as dispose of, property which he himself does not own. This
is a suitable working definition for the intents and purposes of the book. From an academic
perspective, however, it is very narrow, and it does not correspond entirely with the established
use of the concept of power in analytical jurisprudence. Thomas does not engage with, or refer
to, Hohfeld’s definition of power. This is regrettable, since Hohfeld’s taxonomy of fundamental
private law concepts is adopted in virtually all contemporary discussions on the nature and
content of legal rights, lato sensu.
Another relevant part of this chapter deals with the similarities between principles of
judicial review in public law and principles of exercise of discretion in private law. Thomas
has an ambivalent position in this respect. On the one hand, he outlines the extensive cross-
fertilisation and close parallels existing between the principles applicable to the exercise of
powers in public law and in private law. Moreover, the grounds on which the exercise of
fiduciary powers may be challenged are remarkably similar to those laid down as the basis
for judicial review in public law. On the other hand, he discards such parallels as superficial
